In Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna (Buckeye),
this week’s reading addressed whether “the doctrine of Prima Paint extend[s] to a scenario where a contract is allegedly
void because it is illegal --- even criminal --- under state law.” For purposes of recap, Prima Paint's doctrine is that an arbitrator must
decide a challenge to the enforceability of a contract when the contract has an
arbitration clause, unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause
itself.
In Buckeye, John
Cardegna signed a contract for a loan from Buckeye Check Cashing. The contract contained a clause in which
Cardegna agreed to resolve any controversies concerning the loan through
arbitration. Sometime later, Cardegna
sued Buckeye, claiming that the conditions for the loan stipulated by the
contract were illegal; specifically, that the loan rates involved in the
contract were usurious. Buckeye filed a
motion to compel to have the case
resolved by arbitration, as required by the contract. Cardegna countered that the contract as a
whole was illegal and that the arbitration clause was therefore not
enforceable. The court agreed and ruled
for Cardegna.
On appeal, the state appeals court reversed, holding that
the FAA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, allows arbitration clauses
to be enforced even if they are part of otherwise invalid contracts. The appeals court relied on the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Prima Paint. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the
appeals court's use of Prima Paint,
however, because the contract in that case had been merely voidable, while the
contract in Cardegna's case was actually illegal, or void. The Florida Supreme Court therefore reversed,
ruling in favor of Cardegna.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. On appeal, the
Court decided whether, under the FAA, a party may avoid arbitration by arguing
that the contract in which the arbitration clause is contained is illegal?
The Court ruled that challenges
to the legality of a contract as a whole must be argued before the arbitrator
rather than a court. The opinion
explained "unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue
of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first
instance." The Court held that the
Florida Supreme Court had been wrong to rely on a distinction between void and
merely voidable contracts, because the word "contract" in the FAA
includes contracts later found to be void.
In the notes and questions section following the Buckeye opinion, this week’s reading
provides the following background information and asks the following question:
A contract between Ferrer, who appears on television as
“Judge Alex,” and Preston, an entertainment lawyer, required arbitration of
“any dispute . . . relating to the [contract] terms . . . of the breach,
validity, or legality thereof . . . in accordance with the [AAA] Rules.” When Preston demanded arbitration, seeking
fees allegedly due under the contract, Ferrer petitioned the California Labor
Commissioner for a determination that the contract was invalid and
unenforceable under the California Talent Agencies Act because Preston had
failed to acquire a license as a talent agent.
Should a court enforce the arbitration agreement or direct the parties
to proceed before the Labor Commissioner?
Before addressing the foregoing question, it is interesting to note that “Judge Alex” is not actually a judge,
but is rather an arbitrator. In 1995, he
became an Associate Administrative Judge in the Criminal Division of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, where he spent ten years presiding over criminal
cases. He also presided as an appellate
judge over appeals from the Miami-Dade County Court, County Commission, and
numerous other governmental bodies. In
1999, he was elected to serve as District Representative to the Executive Committee of the Conference of
Circuit Court Judges, a position he held until 2001. He is a member of the Florida Bar and the
District of Columbia Bar Association. He
has been an adjunct professor at Florida
International University, and teaches media relations to other
judges at The New Judges College and The College of Advanced Judicial Studies,
as well as at various national conferences.
With Buckeye’s
holding in mind, before reading the case, I surmise that the answer to the
above question is that a court should enforce the arbitration
agreement. After all, in Buckeye, the court stated: "unless the challenge is to the
arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered
by the arbitrator in the first instance."
The foregoing excerpt does not appear to provide a loophole for the fact
pattern presented above; rather, it very broad.
As expected, the court ruled that the answer to the above question is that a court should enforce the arbitration agreement.
It is interesting to note that Buckeye was decided while Preston's appeal was pending. Therefore, not surprisingly,
Preston argued that under Buckeye the trial court had erred in enjoining
the arbitration, because the arbitrator, not the Labor Commissioner, should
decide the validity of the contract. The
state appellate court disagreed, distinguishing Buckeye on the ground
that it did not apply to decisions of administrative agencies.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed. The Court said that the key
question was “who decides whether Preston acted as personal manager” (in which
case the contract would be valid) “or as talent agent” (in which case the
contract would be void). Preston argued
that, under Buckeye, that was a question for the arbitrator; Ferrer
insisted that the Labor Commissioner should get first crack at it. The Supreme Court agreed with Preston.
Do you buy the holding of Buckeye and its progeny? Should voidable and void contracts be treated differently? Reflect on a phrase from the reading: “to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a
contract challenged as unlawful[, or void,] ‘could breathe life into a contract
that not only violate state law, but also is criminal in nature . . . .’”
Sources:
The Book;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_Ferrer
Buckeye
Preston
I agree with the holding of Buckeye and in general, the policy reasoning in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements. Allowing parties to argue either that contracts are void or voidable in court instead of in arbitration creates a loophole for almost every arbitration agreement that allows parties to just end up in courts. It shouldn't really matter if there are small defects in a contract and then avoid the arbitration agreement altogether. And, as a safeguard, arbitrators will still be able to decide the nature of the contract, and if the contract issues under dispute besides arbitration are void. I don't think that's really "breathing life into a contract that violates state law, or is criminal in nature."
ReplyDeleteThe cases that we have read that deal with the separability problem seem somewhat reasonable in terms of the idea that just because a contract might be illegal does not mean that the arbitration agreement was also created under illegal circumstances. It seems reasonable that someone agreeing to a cash-lending scheme might later contest the illegal rates agreed upon in the contract and still be content to arbitrate the issue. However, I am still suspicious of the enforceability of arbitration agreements in illegal contracts in general because these contracts might have been entered into under much more nefarious circumstances. I'm not sure that I'm completely convinced that the question of the illegality of a contract would have no bearing on whether the party would have agreed to arbitrate in the first place. Indeed, had a party known that the other party was performing a criminal or illegal act, they might have immediately become very uneasy with the idea of arbitrating a dispute with that person.
ReplyDeleteFrom a policy standpoint, I can see why the Court came to its decision. Fights over void vs. voidable would create the type of litigation issues arbitration attempts to avoid. I just find it intuitively wrong that an illegal, possibly criminal contract can be enforced because of a valid arbitration provision. If a party is confident in its chances at arbitration, or at least knows that it will never be in a public court, I don't see an incentive to write valid contracts. I believe this presents a loophole that can allow illegal behavior by a party without enough consequences to discourage them.
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